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WHAT DO BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS DO?
GÁBOR TAMÁS MOLNÁR1
ABSTRACT This article provides a review of the literature on business 
associations (BAs) in line with the following questions: (1) What are the economic 
roles of BAs, (2) How are BAs institutionalized, and (3) What drives BAs to engage 
in socially beneficial or harmful activities? Challenging the popular distinction 
between beneficial, market-supporting and harmful, rent-seeking (lobbying) goals 
of BAs, we demonstrate that there are three major economic roles of BAs, all of 
which can involve activities linked to the private order and the public order, and all 
of which can be socially beneficial or harmful. We also challenge the proposition 
that institutional strength is needed for BAs to fulfil beneficial economic roles, 
highlighting that BAs have three main institutional functions, and the level of 
institutionalization of each of the functions can be different in relation to their 
beneficial economic roles. We suggest that whether BAs tend toward engage in in 
socially beneficial or harmful activities depends on their private-order and public-
order institutional limitations.
KEYWORDS: business associations, institutional order, collective action, trade 
associations, industry associations
INTRODUCTION
What do business associations do? For a long time, economists viewed BAs 
as “interest groups” engaged in rent-seeking by influencing public decisions 
(Ekelund − Tollison, 2001). As for their functioning, the crucial question 
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appeared to be whether they could develop appropriate internal incentives for 
overcoming free-riding and promoting collective action. As Olson famously 
argued (Olson, 1971), for larger groups this typically meant the introduction 
of “selective incentives” for participation by a “political entrepreneur.” In the 
1990s, scholars in the “new institutional” tradition started to challenge this 
received view (Greif, 2008), leading to the explicit attack mounted in a pair of 
articles by Doner and Schneider (Doner − Schneider, 2000; Schneider − Doner, 
2000). The former authors argued and illustrated using several examples that 
business associations pursue many other goals besides “rent-seeking.”
What do BAs actually do? Empirical studies based on the subjective evaluations 
of stakeholders have demonstrated the importance of several distinct activities 
of BAs in different contexts, but have not led to clear conclusions (Battisti − 
Perry, 2015; Bennett, 1998; Bennett − Ramsden, 2007; McCormick et al., 2008; 
Rochlitz, 2016; Yakovlev et al., 2014). We suggest that the contradictory nature 
of such empirical results is explained by business associations fulfilling various 
economic roles that are relevant to a different extent in different contexts. 
Furthermore, the same activity may fulfil different economic roles at the same 
time, such as is the case with providing information to policy makers to obtain 
benefits for an industry. There can also be significant differences between the 
economic roles observed by those participating in collective action, and the 
actual effects of collective action (Ville, 2007).
The standard approach of most studies has been to look at the presence of 
certain activities or the presence of certain outcomes related to these activities. 
Our goal is not to argue for any specific theory of BA functionality. Instead, we 
employ a model approach, in which we suggest starting with an analysis of the 
institution and its main goals, and then structuring the manifold activities that are 
identifiable along these lines. This article provides a review of the literature on 
BAs within a new conceptual framework. Its goals are twofold: (1) to highlight the 
common features of these diverse institutions and what we know about them, and 
(2) to challenge two widespread propositions about their economic roles.
Our starting point is that the main research question should be divided into 
three further sub-questions:
1.  What are the economic roles of BAs?
2.  How are BAs institutionalized in order to fulfil their economic roles?
3.  What drives BAs to engage in socially beneficial or harmful activities?
Following these lines of questioning, we provide some structure for our 
knowledge about the subject, point out the gaps therein, and identify potentially 
fruitful directions for future research, while challenging two widespread 
propositions about the economic roles of BAs.
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In section two, we provide a conceptualization of BAs as an umbrella term for 
private, formalized, non-commercial organizations that are intended to further 
the business interests of their members. We highlight the position of BAs as 
planned, private-order institutions positioned in-between spontaneous and 
public-order institutions.
In section three we deal with our first question by providing a typology of the 
many economic roles of BAs based on how they contribute to fulfilling their 
basic goals. Following a review of the literature in this area, we seek to challenge 
the widespread distinction between the beneficial-, market-supporting- and the 
harmful-, rent-seeking/lobbying goals of BAs by demonstrating that (1) all of 
the studied economic roles of BAs can involve activities linked to the private-
order and the public-order, and that (2) all of the studied economic roles can be 
linked to both socially beneficial and harmful activities.
Section four reviews our knowledge in relation to the second question concerning 
institutionalization. We suggest that BAs have three basic institutional functions 
in relation to solving collective action problems: (1) information-sharing, (2) 
rule-articulation, and (3) incentivizing compliance. These institutional functions 
can be institutionalized at different levels, constituting four distinct ideal types 
of institutional forms of BAs: (1) intermediary, (2) associational governance, 
(3) self-regulation, and (4) co-regulation. Reviewing the literature from this 
perspective, we challenge Doner − Schneider’s (2000) claim that a business 
association needs a certain level of institutional strength to be able to fulfil 
beneficial, “market-supporting” economic roles by demonstrating that beneficial 
contributions are possible at each of the different levels of institutionalization in 
relation to each of the economic roles of BAs.
Section five structures our rather limited knowledge about the topic of the 
third question. We propose that whether BAs institutionalize socially beneficial 
economic roles depends on the institutional incentives by which they are 
affected. Five main drivers of the beneficial roles of BAs emerge from the 
scarce evidence. Private-order constraints on BAs include (1) market pressure 
on the membership of BAs, (2) internal governance solutions to principal-agent 
problems, and (3) the competition between BAs and other similar institutions. 
Public-order constraints of BAs depend on (4) political accountability, and (5) 
the monitoring capabilities of public-order institutions.
Section six concludes and points out what we consider the most important 
avenues for further research on BAs.
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THE NATURE OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
The main features of BAs
There are many related concepts used in political economy for the 
institutionalized collective action of businesspeople: business-, professional-, 
sectoral-, and industrial associations, all sorts of entrepreneurial and rotary 
clubs, as well as chambers of commerce belong to this group. We adopt Prüfer’s 
(2016) synthesis of earlier definitions, whereby business associations are 
[considered] private, formalized, non-commercial organizations, intended to 
further the business interests of their members. BAs are private institutions, 
based at least partially on the voluntary cooperation of their members. They 
include semi-voluntary or mandatory membership organizations if these also 
institutionalize voluntary cooperation, and thus are not entirely public-order, 
governmental institutions. BAs are formalized institutions, which means that 
they have their own rules about membership and decision-making, and are long-
term structures in contrast to ad-hoc coalitions of business collective action 
(Doner − Schneider, 2000, p. 280).
Since BAs are intended to further the business interests of certain groups 
of businesses,  they are distinctive in relation to the business communities 
that exist behind these organized interests (Saitgalina et al., 2016). Business 
communities can be defined by their common knowledge base, common 
interests or common values, and goals. The former can result from (1) 
being engaged in similar occupations or in similar markets and industries, 
(2) being embedded in similar institutional orders due to geographical 
proximity, or by (3) belonging to similar communities outside of business, 
such as religious or political groups. The three dimensions can intersect in 
various ways, defining various forms of associations. Associations can be 
linked to specific occupations (professional associations), industries and 
interests (industry, trade and cluster associations), or the broad occupational 
group of entrepreneurship (entrepreneurial associations and business clubs). 
They might involve underlying value-based communities, such as Christian 
business clubs or Lions clubs. They can be local clubs, regional or national 
associations, or even international or global associational confederations. In 
our review, we use the term business association for all the above institutions 
insofar as they fit our criteria.
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BAs as planned private-order institutions
Business associations are planned, private-order institutions positioned 
somewhere between spontaneous and planned public-order institutions (Greif, 
2008). This means that BAs build upon the spontaneous private order of markets 
and communities, but are also able to overcome some of the limitations of the 
former due to their planned nature. They also differ from public-order institutions 
in that they are private, voluntary institutions. This position means that BAs 
are bridging organizations that connect informal community structures to the 
formal public-order. Their economic roles are determined by the limitations of 
each alternative, but they can also build upon the resources of their informal 
base or their public-order relations. The distinguishing feature of BAs among 
planned, private institutions is that they feature a separate, non-commercial 
form of central organization and multilateral relations, instead of bilateral 
relations structured by a profit-oriented central actor (Lindberg et al., 1991).
THE ECONOMIC ROLES OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Business associations as rent-seeking
A widespread approach in the literature distinguishes between the beneficial, 
market-supporting and the harmful, rent-seeking role of BAs, the latter which 
is often associated with lobbying (Battisti − Perry, 2015; Duvanova, 2013; 
Marques, 2017; Sukiassyan − Nugent, 2011; Ville, 2007). We suggest that it is 
perhaps better to approach the issue starting with the understanding of BAs as 
institutions intended to further the goals of a business community. This means 
that BAs are inherently “rent-seeking” institutions in the broad sense that their 
basic goal is to increase the economic rent of a community of firms.
In the broader economic sense, rents are returns in excess of the opportunity 
costs of resources spent on an activity (Tollison, 1982). Rent-seeking as the 
pursuit of economic rent thus understood is the essential driving force behind all 
economic activity. In this sense, rent-seeking is not necessarily a negative term, 
as rents can be obtained by value-creating activities such as developing a new 
product or reducing production costs. Such innovative rent-seeking activities 
lead to increased market power and higher returns or lower opportunity costs, 
increasing the innovator’s economic rent.
Rent-seeking in its public-choice sense generally refers to non-value-creating, 
redistributive ways of obtaining economic rent. Classic examples include 
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increasing market power through reducing competition through entry barriers, 
and seeking transfers from other groups by influencing public decisions 
(Tollison, 2012). These activities redistribute rents from other individuals instead 
of creating new value, and are therefore harmful to society in that they lead to 
wasted economic effort. We can associate the socially beneficial economic roles 
of BAs with value-creating, rent-seeking activities, while their socially harmful 
activities are those aimed at redistributive rent-seeking.
By reviewing the economic roles that business associations fulfil from this 
perspective, we seek to illustrate that it is possible for both “market-supporting” 
and “lobbying” types of activities to represent beneficial, value-creating and 
harmful, redistributive rent-seeking. In order to do this, we demonstrate – based 
on previous studies – that (1) all of the studied economic roles of BAs can involve 
activities linked to the private-order and the public-order, and that (2) all of 
their economic roles can contribute to both value-creating and redistributive 
rent-seeking.
There are three main types of economic role, defined by the three ways 
through which BAs can contribute to value-creating rent-seeking. The first type 
may be called the vertical economic role, because it is mainly concerned with 
transactions along the value chain. This economic role enables more value-
creating transactions by reducing transaction costs and protecting the rents 
obtained from those transactions. The second type may be called a horizontal 
economic role, because it concerns the cooperation that occurs within business 
communities aimed at securing public goods for themselves. These public 
goods contribute to value-creating rent-seeking by lowering costs and enabling 
innovative economic activities. The third type is that of the external economic 
role, as it is concerned with the relations of business communities to other 
social groups. By contributing to the resolution of social conflict, it enables the 
community to protect its economic rent. We do not consider redistributive rent-
seeking to be a separate economic role of BAs, but instead propose that any 
of the economic roles of the latter can involve redistributive elements, if the 
institutional context allows this.
Vertical economic role: enabling more value-creating 
transactions
BA activities in the first group are defined by their economic role in 
improving the transactional order of the business community. These concern 
vertical relationships along value chains that may be found inside or outside the 
community. While the other economic roles of BAs also contribute to better 
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functioning markets, in the former cases collective action directly enables 
value-creating transactional solutions.
Protecting property rights
BAs have an economic role as private, planned, coercion-constraining 
institutions (Greif, 2008). By sanctioning breaches of property rights, such 
as public expropriation or violent takeover of assets, these activities increase 
the incentive of private actors to invest in economic activities, thus enabling 
more complex forms of cooperation (Duvanova, 2007, 2013; Hedberg, 2011; 
Pyle, 2011; Rochlitz, 2016; Yakovlev et al., 2014). Association activities related 
to this economic role include spreading information about violations of rights, 
coordinating sanctions against violators through suspending transactions 
(Kazun, 2015), and pressuring the government to guarantee property rights 
(Mikamo, 2013).
Reducing transaction costs
The other basic transaction-enabling role of BAs involves reducing transaction 
costs. Business associations may help lower transaction costs in a variety 
of ways (Recanatini − Ryterman, 2001), resulting in more value-creating 
transactions. These can include lowering search costs by providing information 
about potential partners, lowering bargaining costs by coordinating common 
contractual frameworks, or lowering enforcement costs by improving existing 
contract enforcement mechanisms or institutionalizing new ones.
By providing platforms for information-sharing and the development of 
informal ties, associations reduce the cost associated with finding business 
partners, as well as the cost of contracting (De Clercq et al., 2010). Associations 
contribute to increasing credible commitment in contractual relationships by both 
improving the spread of information about rule-breakers and helping coordinate 
sanctions against them (McMillan − Woodruff, 2000). These institutions can 
enable decentralized, reputation-based contract enforcement (Prüfer, 2016; 
Pyle, 2005, 2006b), as well as reduce the costs associated with formal contract 
enforcement through offering arbitration services. Sanctioning opportunism 
can be expected to increase the credibility of both members’ promises and 
promises made to members (Johnson et al., 2002). BAs can also institutionalize 
professional and ethical regulations for dealing with reputation commons 
(Barnett, 2006). Similarly to the case of credible commitments, business 
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associations contribute to the latter through facilitating information sharing, 
which enables third-party or community enforcement, or by institutionalizing 
this enforcement themselves (Lenox − Nash, 2003).
Horizontal economic roles: providing public goods
BAs can facilitate the provision of public goods, enabling more value-creating 
transactions through reducing costs and encouraging innovative business 
activity.
Maintaining the knowledge base of the community
Associations can play various economic roles in relation to the provision of 
knowledge required for a business community. Firms can organize and co-fund 
training and certification activities through business associations (Maennig et 
al., 2015; McCormick et al., 2008). This helps to overcome the free-rider problem 
inherent in the spread of on-the-job training and non-specific, transferable 
knowledge, as firms can funnel-in employees from other companies who have 
invested in knowledge, leading to low-effort equilibrium. An important aspect 
of business associations’ capacity for spurring innovation is their ability to foster 
information sharing, whether through channeling scientific results into the 
professional community (Luna − Tirado, 2008) or through developing networks 
(Schwartz − Bar-El, 2015). Due to knowledge spillover effects, participants in 
these networks have positive external effects on each other (De La Maza-Y-
Aramburu et al., 2012).
The successful participation of professionals in the exploratory processes 
of innovation and governance requires more than gathering and applying 
information. Business associations can create the institutional settings for the 
development of professional identities, shared intellectual foundations, and 
professional solutions, all of which are required for the successful adaptation 
of an industry to changing conditions (Greenwood et al., 2002; Nordqvist et 
al., 2010). Mike (2017) applies Michael Polányi’s (1951) concept of intellectual 
order to conceptualize the underlying institutionalized communities behind 
an industry or profession. An intellectual order entails more than information 
sharing, as it institutionalizes a shared search for truth in the form of 
professional solutions, new ideas, and the ethos of professionalism, as well 
as mediating between industry and related intellectual fields of science and 
technology.
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Joint provision of infrastructure
By collectively developing and maintaining infrastructure, BAs can take 
advantage of external economies of scale without having to give up their 
autonomy (Kingsbury − Hayter, 2006). This allows them to reduce their costs, 
leading to higher economic rent. Examples include jointly organized, capital-
intensive R&D activities (Lamberg et al., 2017), as well as maintaining shared 
sales infrastructure (Hashino − Kurosawa, 2013; McNamara, 1993).
External economic roles: Coordinating solutions to social conflicts
In such cases, collective action goes beyond the direct goals of the business 
community and involves coordinating relations with other groups in order 
to protect rent, or to obtain external resources. Social conflicts arise from 
differences between the economic rationality of the business community and 
the goals of other social groups. Conflicts can be resolved by engaging with the 
other stakeholders directly or through government policy. 
Resolving social conflicts
BAs can be used for resolving conflicts that arise from the external effects 
of the business community’s activities on other social groups. Marques (2017) 
provides a recent review of the social-responsibility-related activities of BAs. 
These might allow for structured engagement and bargaining with stakeholders 
(Dickson − Arcodia, 2010), defining and enforcing professional standards 
for dealing with external effects (Font et al., 2019; King − Lenox, 2000), or 
generating self-regulation that helps maintain a shared social reputation (King 
et al., 2002; Tucker, 2008).
Coordinating involvement in (development-, economic-, social-, etc.) policies
Business associations can be involved in the formulation and implementation 
of various government policies. Areas such as development policy (Hashino − 
Kurosawa, 2013) and economic stabilization policies (Schneider − Doner, 2000) 
may benefit from the involvement of private institutions. Associations can also 
aggregate the opinions of their members and transmit them to policymakers. 
This contributes to the public good of having more informed, higher quality 
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policies (Chappin et al., 2008). Business associations can help with overcoming 
horizontal coordination problems associated with economic development, 
such as the acceptance of technological and quality standards (Schneider − 
Doner, 2000). These coordination activities do not necessarily replace market 
competition, but are able to elevate it to new levels (Berk − Schneiberg, 2005).
Redistributive rent-seeking
There are four ways for BAs to engage in redistributive rent-seeking, none of 
which necessarily involve lobbying or even engaging with the public-order, as 
they can also rely on the private-order.
BAs can be platforms for (1) collusive practices, whereby firms reduce 
competition through agreements (McMillan − Woodruff, 2000, pp. 3, 38). 
Reduced competition leads to redistribution from potential entrants and 
consumers. Collusive practices can be organized under the pretense of any joint 
activities, but they are most relevant for economic roles that involve horizontal 
coordination, whether for providing public goods or for resolving external 
conflict. Collusion can also result from the coordination of contractual rules, 
which belongs to the transaction cost-reducing role. These arrangements can 
only be stable if entry barriers are present or entrants are incentivized to join 
such agreements. (2) Entry barriers are mainly related to ethical and professional 
self-regulation, which are elements of vertical and external economic roles.
Both collusion and self-regulation require selective benefits to become stabilized, 
while these benefits themselves can lead to (3) exclusive institutional orders 
(Johansson − Elg, 2002). When property rights or contracts are only selectively 
enforced, or access to public goods and external mediation is selectively provided, 
this can lead to entry barriers for agents external to  BAs, therefore lessening 
competition. The intellectual orders of business communities can also be barriers 
to change if they are closed in nature (Mike, 2017), thereby protecting the 
entrenched interests of incumbents, instead of supporting more efficient solutions. 
Selective access to resources can be based on any of the listed economic roles, if 
they are allowed to become exclusive in their institutionalization.
The textbook case of redistribution involves (4) coercion in relation to 
obtaining resources from other groups, which in contemporary polities is 
exercised through the state. In the absence of an effective public order, mafia-
like BAs can extract resources directly from other groups through private-order 
coercion. Redistribution through coercion is mostly related to the external 
economic roles of BAs, but it can also involve activities linked to protecting 
property rights.
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HOW ARE BAs INSTITUTIONALIZED?
Doner − Schneider (2000) propose that there is a relationship between the 
beneficial contributions of BAs and their institutional strength, claiming that 
a certain level of institutionalization is needed for a business association to be 
able to fulfil beneficial, “market-supporting” economic roles. While it is true 
that associations at different levels of institutionalization contribute in different 
ways, the relationship does not seem to be that straightforward. It is perhaps 
better to approach the question from the perspective of the institutional functions 
underlying the economic roles of BAs. We distinguish three institutional 
functions of BAs, and propose that each of them can be institutionalized at 
different levels, constituting four typical institutional forms. From a review of 
the literature regarding this approach, we seek to demonstrate that beneficial 
contributions related to each of the economic roles of BAs are possible at each 
of the different levels of institutionalization.
How can BAs contribute?
How can BAs contribute to solving the various collective-action problems 
in which they are involved? Collective-action problems generally require 
institutional solutions, and different levels of the former require different 
levels of institutional arrangements to support stable cooperative solutions. 
Pure coordination problems only require the institutionalization of common 
knowledge that is created among actors. Coordination problems with a conflictual 
element require some form of institutionalized rules of compensation. Rules in 
this context can be defined as “shared understandings by participants about 
enforced prescriptions concerning what actions or outcomes are required, 
prohibited, or permitted” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 18). Prisoner’s-dilemma type 
problems require the institutionalization of rules and sanctions in order to 
overcome free-riding concerns.
BAs can contribute to each of these institutional solutions by supporting any of 
the three main institutional functions that are involved: information-sharing for 
the creation of common knowledge, rule-articulation for defining compensatory 
institutions and creating focal points which increase commitment to solutions, 
and institutionalizing sanctions for incentivizing compliance with rules.
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Information-sharing
BAs can institutionalize information-sharing by (1) providing a forum for 
their community, (2) sharing information themselves as central intermediaries, 
(3) structuring and formalizing information-sharing, and (4) incentivizing 
structured information sharing by community members. These activities 
allow community members to become aware of collective action problems, the 
actors involved in collective problems, and the goals of stakeholders who are 
involved. This institutional function does not change the set of stable solutions 
that are available, but reduces the costs associated with coordinating solutions 
and incentivizing compliance through other institutional mechanisms through 
equalizing the information available to each actor.
Rule-articulation
BAs can contribute to rule-articulation at various levels. They can (1) provide 
a common platform for members to articulate rules, (2) institutionalize rule-
articulation to provide common processes, or (3) provide formalized ways of 
defining rules. These functions allow community members to better coordinate 
solutions to collective problems without changing the set of stable solutions 
itself, and by institutionalizing focal points for harmonizing expectations about 
what others are going to do.
Incentivizing compliance
To incentivize compliance with rules, BAs can either (1) improve the 
functioning of sanctions provided by other institutions, or (2) institutionalize 
their own associational sanctions. By incentivizing compliance, BAs can 
modify the set of stable solutions that is available for managing collective action 
problems.
Levels of BA institutionalization
Based on the analysis of institutional functions in the previous section, we 
can derive four distinct institutional forms of BA. These theorized forms are 
ideal types. Although subsequent levels build on each other, the order reflects 
the level of institutionalized collective action, not a development path. Several 
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different forms might co-exist within the same community. The following 
subsections describe each ideal type in terms of the institutionalization of each 
of the three institutional functions, while Table 1 provides an overview of the 
four institutional forms.
Intermediary association
The first level of institutionalization corresponds roughly to what Galambos 
(1966) in his  theory of BA institutionalization called a “dinner-club association.” 
An information intermediary BA provides a platform for sharing information 
that “greases the gears” of other institutional mechanisms. It provides no formal 
rules or incentives at the BA level, instead relying on those provided by other 
institutions. It is useful for harmonizing beliefs and expectations within and 
around the business community that foster spontaneous contract enforcement 
mechanisms based on ethics, social norms, and reputation, or for facilitating 
information to and from public-order institutions in order to improve their 
functioning. Information intermediaries do not create stable solutions to 
collective action problems themselves, but might reduce the transaction costs of 
coming up with and maintaining solutions.
Associational governance
In addition to sharing information, associational governance means that 
common rules are articulated at the BA level. Associational governance is 
exercised through a process of structured bargaining (Ville, 2007), which 
means that it is not self-regulation yet, as at this level the BA itself does not 
institutionalize sanctions related to compliance. It rather contributes to 
harmonizing expectations about what actions are considered right within the 
community, and providing focal points for solving collective action problems, 
without changing the incentive structure of a situation itself. Its economic role 
as a rule-setting platform provides a BA with a natural central position as an 
information-sharing institution as well.
Self-regulation
The term “self-regulation” is often used to mean solutions at any of the 
first three levels of institutionalization. For our purposes, we define a self-
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regulatory association as one in which, in addition to information-sharing and 
rule-articulation, incentivizing compliance with the rules of the community is 
also institutionalized at the associational level. This requires the BA not only 
to articulate but also to formalize common rules and create sanctions at the BA 
level that are backed by their own selective incentives. These incentives are tied 
either directly to rule-compliance or to membership itself, with membership 
being tied to rule-compliance. This allows the self-regulatory BA to change 
the payoff structure of collective action problems, changing the set of feasible 
stable solutions at the community level. Sanctioning at the associational level 
also tends to require BAs to formalize some information sharing in order to 
fulfil their monitoring function, while it also provides them with the tools to 
incentivize compliance with the procedures of information sharing.
Self-regulation does not necessarily imply a lack of public-order regulatory 
mechanisms, but merely that privately designed regulation mechanisms operate 
without direct reliance on the former. Nor does self-regulation mean a lack 
of reliance on informal mechanisms. The dividing line is the existence of 
institutionalized sanctioning mechanisms at the collective level.
Co-regulation
The final institutional form is co-regulation, which represents an alternative 
solution to the problem of institutionalizing selective incentives. A co-regulatory 
association receives the backing of the public-order in the form of the legal 
sanctions or resources on which its sanctions are based (Muraközy − Valentiny, 
2015). These often include mandatory membership or participation, or granting 
official legal status to rules and decisions of the association. These additional 
resources might provide co-regulatory BAs with even greater capacity to 
restructure problems of collective action. Co-regulation is also expected to 
institutionalize information-sharing and rule-articulation, even if it tends to 
include public-order rules and information sources. Co-regulation often blurs 
the line between voluntary and mandatory association, as related activities are 
not necessarily all backed by public legal sanctions.
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Table 1 Level of institutionalization of the three main institutional functions for the 
four typical forms of institutionalization 
Level of collective 
action




Platform + (possibly 
central) information 
intermediary
Provided by other 
institutions








formalized) at the 
association level
Provided by other 
institutions







formalized at the 
association level
Associational 
sanctions based on 
membership benefits 
and services







formalized at the 
association level + 
some have official 
public status
Associational 
sanctions based on 
membership benefits 




Levels of institutionalization and the economic roles of BAs
Doner − Schneider (2000) propose that a certain level of institutionalization 
is needed for a business association to be able to fulfil market-supporting 
economic roles. We suggest that each of the four levels of institutionalization 
is relevant for each of the proposed economic roles, as BAs with different 
levels of institutional strength can contribute in different ways. In the following 
sections we provide an overview of the economic roles which BAs at different 
levels of institutionalization are able to fulfil, attempting to highlight that (1) all 
institutional levels, even including simple information intermediaries, can be 
beneficial, and that (2) higher levels of institutionalization can enable harmful 
forms of rent-seeking, not only beneficial coordination.
If intermediary BAs can rely on spontaneous or public-order sanctions, they 
are able to coordinate various forms of collective action. They can enable value-
creating transactions by spreading information about business partners and 
regulations (Betton et al., 2018; Cai − Szeidl, 2018; Johnson et al., 2002; Leonidou 
− Katsikeas, 1997; Pyle, 2005, 2006b; Recanatini − Ryterman, 2001), and about 
breaches of property rights (Pyle, 2011; Rochlitz, 2016). They can improve 
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knowledge-sharing (Costa et al., 2017; Kirby, 1988; Luna − Tirado, 2008; Pyle, 
2006a; Qiao et al., 2014) and reduce the transaction costs of coordinating shared 
infrastructural projects (McNamara, 1993). They can also reduce the cost of 
engagement with stakeholders in relation to externalities (Dickson − Arcodia, 
2010) and on developing and implementing public policies (Schneider, 2010; 
Stolz − Schrammel, 2014).
BAs at the level of associational governance can articulate common goals 
and rules, which enable them to orient collective action in various cases if 
they can connect these to other institutional incentives. They can coordinate 
contracts and knowledge-sharing to reduce transaction costs (Herrigel, 1993; 
Lane − Bachmann, 1997; Rademakers, 2000), to facilitate joint investment in 
public goods (Berk − Schneiberg, 2005) and innovation (Faulconbridge, 2007; 
McCormick et al., 2008; Nordqvist et al., 2010; Perez-Aleman, 2003). They can 
enable community reputational mechanisms in contract enforcement (Masten 
− Prüfer, 2014; Prüfer, 2016), the protection of property rights (Dixit, 2015; 
Hedberg, 2011; Nugent − Sukiassyan, 2009), and in dealing with social conflicts 
(Font et al., 2019; King − Lenox, 2000). They can also articulate community-
level interests to improve policymaking.
The presence of formal sanctioning and monitoring capacities enable self-
regulatory BAs to institutionalize solutions to the problems of free-riding and 
preference heterogeneity. They can help enforce the self-regulation of ethical 
and professional standards for contract enforcement (Bernstein, 1992, 2001; 
Dentoni et al., 2012; Gehrig − Jost, 1995; Gunningham − Rees, 1997; McMillan 
− Woodruff, 2000; Ville, 2007), the protection of property rights (Larrain − 
Prüfer, 2015) and resolving external conflicts (Christiansen − Kroezen, 2016; 
King − Berchicci, 2007; Tucker, 2008). They are able to institutionalize the 
community provision of public goods by incentivizing contributions (Kingsbury 
− Hayter, 2006; Lamberg et al., 2017), and to formalize knowledge networks for 
innovation (Greenwood et al., 2002; Kahl, 2018; Schwartz − Bar-El, 2015). They 
are also able to enforce community-level deals with external stakeholders and 
policymakers.
Public-order incentives allow co-regulatory BAs to tackle most conflictual 
prisoner’s-dilemma types of collective action problems. They can institutionalize 
even stronger sanctions to support quality and ethical regulations, contributing 
to contract enforcement (Coleman, 1989; Muraközy − Valentiny, 2015), property 
rights protection (Mikamo, 2013; Yakovlev et al., 2014) and the management of 
social conflicts (Bartle − Vass, 2007; Héritier − Eckert, 2009; Marques, 2017; 
Rees, 1997). They can combine public and private resources to provide public 
goods related to infrastructure and knowledge provision (Athreye − Chaturvedi, 
2007; Hashino − Kurosawa, 2013). They can also enable the implementation and 
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enforcement of even contentious policies to improve outcomes (Schneider, 2010; 
Schneider − Doner, 2000).
This review, along with Section 3.5, demonstrates that stronger 
institutionalization does not necessarily lead to more beneficial (or less harmful) 
activities, while BAs with simpler institutional forms are also able to fulfil 
beneficial roles, depending on the collective problems and contexts at hand.
WHAT DRIVES BAs TO ENGAGE IN SOCIALLY 
BENEFICIAL OR HARMFUL ACTIVITIES?
We have suggested that the beneficial or harmful nature of the activities of 
BAs in relation to economic development is not explained by the presence of 
specific, non-market-oriented activities, nor by the institutional strength of BAs. 
What then, does explain the beneficial or harmful orientation of BA activity? 
We agree with the proposition of Reveley and Ville (2010) that whether the 
institutional capacity of BAs is used for beneficial or for harmful purposes 
mainly depends on the institutional constraints of the latter and the BAs’ 
own institutional governance solutions. It is possible to classify institutional 
constraints by their sources. Here, the starting point that BAs are positioned 
between private-order and public-order is once again helpful, as the former 
constraints stem from the private-order of the community underlying the BA, 
or the public-order in which a BA is embedded. We provide an overview of the 
scarce literature on the institutionalization of BAs that goes beyond the issue 
of selective incentives, highlighting what we consider the four most important 
questions and the gaps in our knowledge about them.
Community (membership) constraints on rent-seeking
As a BA is constituted by its membership, the goals of the underlying business 
community are expected to influence its goals. The first question related to 
this is (1) “when is the underlying business community incentivized to pursue 
value-creating transactions?”  The members of a BA are expected to opt for 
redistributive rent-seeking instead of value-creating transactions if doing so 
increases their economic rent. Competitive pressures can create oversight and 
encourage productivity (Doner − Schneider, 2000), as less productive rent-
seekers might fall behind in market competition.
It is not enough for members to be motivated to pursue value-creating 
activities;  the issue of control is also involved. The second question is thus 
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(2) “when is the business community able to incentivize the BA to pursue its 
activities in line with the community’s goals?” Without some control, BA officials 
can pursue their own goals (Moore − Hamalai, 1993), or become coopted by 
powerful subgroups. The first way for members to control BAs is hierarchically, 
which depends on the success of the internal governance solutions of the BA at 
resolving principal-agent problems. Several elements of institutional strength 
identified by Doner and Schneider (2000) are related to this issue. To avoid 
being controlled by narrow interest groups, BAs need to be able to mediate 
between members with different interests, for which they need transparency 
and institutionalized forms of internal discourse. Studies about the failure of 
self-regulation also call our attention to how business associations need to find 
institutional balance in representing different member groups in order to avoid 
their capture by the most influential group for their own rent-seeking purposes 
(Aldrich, 2018; Barnett, 2013; Yue et al., 2013).
The second way for members to control BAs is indirectly through inter-
association competition. Ville (2007) demonstrates that competition between 
BAs encourages productive roles instead of redistributive, rent-seeking efforts. 
Hock and Gomtsian (2018) propose that a lack of competition was a major 
factor in the development of harmful rent-seeking practices in the case of FIFA. 
Control by other associations can also emerge through the counter-organization 
of affected stakeholder groups (Reveley − Ville, 2010; Schneiberg, 1999).
Public-order constraints on rent-seeking
The other source of institutional constraints on harmful rent-seeking is the 
public-order (Doner − Schneider, 2000; Reveley − Ville, 2010). This constraint 
depends on the willingness and the capacity of the public-order to steer BAs 
toward productive activities. Therefore, the third question is (3) “when are the 
agents of the public order incentivized to be responsive to the interests of the 
broader community?” This is a question of political accountability, which is 
outside of the scope of this review. We have some evidence in the Russian case 
that political competition and political accountability incentivize policy-makers 
to pay more attention to more encompassing interests (Govorun et al., 2016).
The final question is (4) “when are agents of the public order able to control the 
activity of the BA?” There is a fundamental problem of information asymmetry 
here, as a business community inevitably knows more about its workings 
than any regulatory agency. There is a further issue of regulatory capture 
here: as government agents develop closer relationships and more capacity 
to understand and monitor business communities, they become increasingly 
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likely to internalize their goals instead of enforcing the interests of the broader 
political community (Dal Bó, 2006; Levine − Forrence, 1990). If the interests of 
the business community and the polity do not align, multiple layers of principal-
agent problems can result, whereby the relative successes of private and public-
order actors determine the activities of BAs (Mattli − Büthe, 2005). We suggest 
that further research is needed about all four issues. 
CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD
In this article we suggest that, in order to understand what business associations 
really do, we need to approach them not in terms of observable activities, but 
rather in terms of their underlying institutional rationality. We formulated 
three questions stemming from our main research question. (1) What are the 
economic roles of Bas, (2) How are BAs institutionalized in order to fulfil their 
economic roles, and (3) What drives BAs to engaging in socially beneficial or 
harmful activities?
We claim that BAs are “rent-seeking” institutions broadly understood, as 
their main goal is to increase the economic rent of a community of businesses. 
There are three main economic roles through which they can enable value-
creating rent-seeking: (1) vertical economic roles, which enable more value-
creating transactions along the value chain, (2) horizontal economic roles, 
which enable the provision of public goods which can contribute to economic 
rents, and (3) external economic roles, which allow for coordinating the goals 
of business communities with those of other social groups in order to protect 
economic rent. We challenge the widespread approach in the literature which 
distinguishes between the beneficial, market-supporting, and the harmful, rent-
seeking / lobbying roles of BAs by demonstrating that (1) all of the proposed 
economic roles of BAs can involve activities linked to the private-order and the 
public-order, and that (2) all of the economic roles can contribute to both value-
creating and redistributive rent-seeking.
Regarding the institutionalization of BAs, we suggest that they have three 
basic institutional functions in relation to solving collective action problems: 
(1) information-sharing, (2) rule-articulation, and (3) incentivizing compliance. 
These institutional functions can be institutionalized at different levels, with 
four distinct ideal types of BA institutionalization emerging: (1) intermediary 
BAs, (2) associational governance, (3) self-regulation, and (4) co-regulation. We 
challenge the proposition by Doner − Schneider (2000) that a certain level of 
institutional strength is needed for a business association to be able to fulfil 
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beneficial, “market-supporting” economic roles, by highlighting that beneficial 
contributions from each of the economic roles of BAs are possible at each of the 
different levels of institutionalization.
After proposing that the socially beneficial role of BAs is not explained by 
the presence of specific, non-market-oriented activities, nor by the institutional 
strength of BAs, we give an overview of our limited knowledge concerning 
what drives BAs to engage in socially beneficial or harmful activities. We 
suggest that the institutional incentives created by the private-order and public-
order context explain the orientation of BAs. We hypothesize five main drivers 
of productive orientation: (1) market pressures on the membership of BAs, (2) 
internal governance solutions to principal-agent problems, (3) the competition 
between BAs and other similar institutions, (4) political accountability, and (5) 
the monitoring capabilities of public-order institutions.
We cannot claim that the typologies of our literature review are exhaustive or 
sufficiently detailed for in-depth empirical analysis. The main contribution of 
this study is to highlight that economic roles, institutional functions, and drivers 
of social productivity are distinct, and that instead of conflating them in our 
theories, we should approach them at the level of underlying institutional logics 
in order to link them.
How does distinguishing between the three questions contribute to addressing 
the original puzzle about the nature of BAs? Distinguishing roles allows us to 
go beyond observed activities and to analyze the functional requirements for 
each role in its specific institutional context. Distinguishing functions allows 
us to analyze the institutionalization of each function and then link them to the 
requirements of each role. The issue of social benefit also needs to be tackled 
separately for each economic role by linking them to the general institutional 
constraints of BA activities. 
BAs are positioned between the private-order institutions of business 
communities and public-order institutions of governance, and can complement 
or compete with either. Private-order institutions such as firms, alliances, and 
contractual solutions determine the kinds of collective problems facing BAs, 
as well as their resources for dealing with them. We can also expect different 
BA features to be relevant in neo-corporatist versus pluralist systems, and at 
the supranational, national, and local level, mainly due to the resources and 
constraints provided by the relevant public-order institutions. This means 
that empirical analyses of functionality and institutionalization must deal 
with both the external institutional context and the private-order contexts of 
business communities. Any comparative or natural experiment-based analysis 
of BAs needs to focus on either specific roles (such as contract enforcement), 
specific business communities (industries or professions), or specific systems of 
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governance (policy areas or polities) to deal with the problems of embeddedness 
and multifunctionality.
For a comprehensive understanding of BAs, we need to go beyond specific 
functions and theorize about the relations between the different functions: do 
their underlying institutional logics complement each other, or do they result 
in organizational tensions and trade-offs? Answering these questions can 
shed light on the institutional dynamics, development paths, and institutional 
equilibria for BAs. There has unfortunately been little progress on this topic 
since Schmitter − Streeck’s (1999) pioneering work on the logics of association. 
The institutionalization typology of this paper presents ideal types for 
structuring our review and challenging some of the claims in the literature, but 
we invite scholars to come up with more nuanced theories about the levels of 
BA institutionalization and the factors underlying its processes. Doing this will 
require more in-depth, interdisciplinary studies about the institutionalization of 
business communities and their associational systems that draw on economics, 
business history, and political science, following the steps of Galambos (1966), 
Greif (2006), and Reveley − Ville (2010).
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